

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

December 13, 1983

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

FROM: JACK MATLOCK *JM*

SUBJECT: American Academic on Soviet Policy

The telegram from Moscow I mentioned this morning is attached at Tab I. It reports on the observations of an experienced American academic who spent about ten days in discussions with senior Soviet officials, including Boris Ponomarev, candidate member of the Politburo and head of the Central Committee's International Department, and several other Party and Institute officials not often seen by Americans.

Among the source's conclusions were:

--Fear of war seemed to affect the elite as well as the man on the street.

--A degree of paranoia seemed rampant among high officials, and the danger of irrational elements in Soviet decision making seems higher.

--The election next year seems to have become a key determinant in Soviet foreign policy making, with the aim not to permit the President to assume the role of peacemaker.

--There seems to be a growing climate of neo-Stalinism and outright chauvinism on the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

The scholar also was told that Andropov had directed a more activist role in the Middle East, and that Andropov is increasingly seeking to take control over foreign policy and to undermine Gromyko.

Paragraphs 2-11 are the most relevant ones in the long cable.

Attachment:

Tab I Moscow telegram 15409 of December 10, 1983.

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NLS MOS 7476 #1BY CS NARA DATE 12/12/05

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
DOMESTIC POLICY

1. ~~(C - ENTIRE TEXT)~~

2. SUMMARY: AN AMERICAN ACADEMIC WITH EXCELLENT ENTREE TO THE SOVIET POLITICAL ELITE BRIEFED EMBASSY ON HIS DISCUSSIONS HERE NOVEMBER 28-DECEMBER 8. HE BELIEVES, BASED ON THESE DISCUSSIONS, THAT A SIGNIFICANT SHIFT HAS TAKEN PLACE IN SOVIET THINKING AND ATTITUDES, ESPECIALLY TOWARDS THE U.S., OVER THE PAST SIX MONTHS. WHERE EARLIER SOVIET DECISION-MAKING WAS FOUNDED ALMOST EXCLUSIVELY ON PRAGMATISM AND REASONED CALCULATION, OF SOVIET INTERESTS, EMOTIONALISM AND EVEN IRRATIONALITY ARE NOW ENTERING INTO PLAY. THE ACADEMIC PERCEIVES A GROWING PARANOIA AMONG SOVIET OFFICIALS, AND SEES THEM LITERALLY OBSESSED BY FEAR OF WAR. HE BELIEVES THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE CENTRAL DETERMINING FACTOR IN SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY.

3. THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTED, FURTHER, A CERTAIN SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS AND A LACK OF AN INTEGRATED FOREIGN POLICY, WHICH HE ATTRIBUTES TO ANDROPOV'S LENGTHY ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE AND THE UNCERTAINTY THIS HAS GENERATED. HE FEELS THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP--PARTICULARLY ON DOMESTIC POLICY--AND PINPOINTS THE LOWER PARTY ORGANS (AT THE DISTRICT LEVEL) AND THE ECONOMIC BUREAUCRACIES AS THE MAJOR SOURCES OF OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S DOMESTIC PROGRAMS, AND ANTICIPATES THAT ANDROPOV WILL SHORTLY ATTEMPT TO OVERCOME THIS OPPOSITION THROUGH WIDESPREAD PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE ECONOMIC MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER PARTY LEVELS. ALTHOUGH THE ACADEMIC SENSED THE SAME WIDESPREAD RECOGNITION AMONG HIS INTERLOCUTORS AS HE HAD DURING A PREVIOUS VISIT IN MAY OF THE NECESSITY FOR ECONOMIC CHANGE, HE DETECTED MUCH LESS OPTIMISM THAT THE KIND OF CHANGES REQUIRED TO BREAK OUT OF THE CURRENT IMPASSE COULD BE REALIZED. HIS OWN BELIEF IS THAT THE LEADERSHIP IS EITHER UNWILLING OR UNABLE TO PURSUE OTHER THAN A GRADUAL, INCREMENTAL APPROACH TO ECONOMIC CHANGE, AND THAT EACH SMALL STEP WILL BE ABSORBED BY THE SYSTEM RATHER THAN REFORM IT.

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4. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ANDROPOV HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION BUT CLAIMED THAT HE WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALBEIT ON A SOMEWHAT LIMITED SCHEDULE. THE ACADEMIC GAINED THE IMPRESSION THAT USTINOV HAD STOOD IN FOR THE GENERAL SECRETARY DURING THE LATTER'S ABSENCE. CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. END SUMMARY.

5. THE ACADEMIC IDENTIFIED THREE MAJOR CURRENTS IN SOVIET THINKING THAT HAD EMERGED SINCE HIS VISIT HERE IN MAY:

-- A GENUINE SENSE OF CONCERN OVER TRENDS ON THE INTERNATIONAL STAGE AND A FEAR OF WAR THAT SEEMED TO BE SHARED BY SOVIET CITIZENS GENERALLY. THE OFFICIAL LINE ON FOREIGN AFFAIRS IS GENERALLY BELIEVED BY THE POPULACE.

-- A GROWING CLIMATE OF NEO-STALINISM PARTICULARLY EVIDENT AT THE RAION (DISTRICT) LEVEL AND AMONGST THE YOUNGER GENERATION. FED BY STRONG FEELINGS OF PATRIOTISM AND EVEN CHAUVINISM. THERE IS A GROWING SENSE THAT THE SOVIET UNION IS BEING PUSHED AROUND BY THE U.S., AND THAT RESOURCES MUST BE MOBILIZED TO COUNTERACT THIS THREAT, UTILIZING THE ADVANTAGES WHICH A CENTRALIZED ECONOMY POSSESSES IN THIS REGARD. THE COROLLARY TO THIS IS THAT DOMESTIC ECONOMIC CHANGES CANNOT BE AFFORDED AT THIS TIME.

-- A HIGH DEGREE OF PARANOIA AMONG HIGH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM THE ACADEMIC SPOKE, NOT UNLIKE THE ATMOSPHERE OF THIRTY YEARS AGO. SINCE HIS MAY VISIT, THE ACADEMIC HAS NOTICED THAT ATTITUDES HAVE BECOME MORE PERSONAL AND EMOTIONAL, ESPECIALLY WITH RESPECT TO THE U.S., AND HE DID NOT DISCOUNT THE POSSIBILITY OF IRRATIONAL ELEMENTS IN SOVIET DECISION-MAKING. HE CITED THE STRAIGHTFACED CLAIM MADE TO HIM BY ONE OFFICIAL THAT THE KAL FLIGHT HAD BEEN DELIBERATELY STAGED BY THE U.S.--NOT AS AN INTELLIGENCE FLIGHT--BUT TO PROVOKE THE USSR AND ANTI-SOVIET FEELINGS IN THE WORLD.

6. THE ACADEMIC DECLARED THAT THE STATEMENT RECENTLY MADE BY BRZEZINSKI THAT THE SOVIETS "WOULD CRAWL BACK TO THE NEGOTIATING TABLE" WAS COMPLETELY INCONSISTENT BT

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 MOSCOW 15409

EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: CADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
 DOMESTIC POLICY
WITH THE POSITIONS TAKEN BY HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HERE,
ALL OF HIS SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS HAD UNEQUIVOCALLY
STATED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD NOT RETURN TO SEPARATE
INF TALKS. MOREOVER, ALL HAD EXPECTED THAT THE SOVIET
UNION WOULD NOT CONTINUE WITH START NEGOTIATIONS EITHER,
BUT THIS HAD BEEN EXPRESSED AS PERSONAL OPINION RATHER
THAN AS A CATEGORICAL STATEMENT.

7. THE ACADEMIC FELT THAT THE U.S. PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTIONS HAVE BECOME THE KEY DETERMINANT OF SOVIET
FOREIGN POLICY MAKING. IN THEIR EFFORTS TO PREVENT
THE PRESIDENT'S RE-ELECTION, THE SOVIETS ARE DETERMINED
NOT TO ALLOW HIM TO ASSUME THE MANTLE OF PEACEMAKER.
SOVIET INTERLOCUTORS CLAIMED THAT THE SOVIET SIDE HAD
CONSISTENTLY SHOWED RESTRAINT VIS-A-VIS THE U.S. BUT
HAD MET WITH NO RESPONSE FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. THEY
CLAIMED TO SEE NO INCENTIVE WHATEVER FOR A POLICY OF
RESTRAINT IN THE FUTURE. (IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION
FROM THE AMBASSADOR, THE ACADEMIC ACKNOWLEDGED THAT
NONE OF HIS SOVIET CONTACTS HAD CITED ANY SPECIFIC
EXAMPLES OF PAST SOVIET RESTRAINT.)

8. ON THE SOVIET SIDE, HE FELT THAT THE PARAMETERS
OF ASSESSING RISK HAD SHIFTED AWAY FROM THE BASICALLY
PRAGMATIC APPROACH WHICH HAD IN THE PAST CHARACTERIZED
SOVIET BEHAVIOR ABROAD. THE ACADEMIC SENSED, MOREOVER,
THAT THE SOVIETS DO NOT, AT THIS TIME, HAVE AN INTEGRATED
FOREIGN POLICY. THIS WAS PARTIALLY A FUNCTION OF THE
SERIOUSNESS AND COMPLEXITY OF THE PROBLEMS FACING THEM.
A MORE IMPORTANT FACTOR, HE FELT, WAS THE UNSETTLED
STATE OF THE LEADERSHIP.

THE MIDDLE EAST

9. THE ACADEMIC CITED THE MIDDLE EAST AS AN EXAMPLE
OF AN AREA WHERE THE LACK OF A COHERENT SOVIET POLICY
IS EVIDENT. WHILE SOVIET OFFICIALS HAD WARNED
THAT "YOU CAN BE SURE WE WILL REACT" TO ANY U.S. ACTION
AGAINST SYRIA, THE SCHOLAR FELT THAT IN FACT HIS INTER-
LOCUTORS HAD NO CLEAR IDEA WHAT FORM THIS REACTION WOULD

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TAKE. THERE SEEMED, MOREOVER, TO BE CERTAIN BASIC CONTRADICTIONS IN SOVIET ASSESSMENTS OF THE CURRENT SITUATION IN LEBANON. ON THE ONE HAND, THE ACADEMIC HEARD REPEATED EXPRESSIONS OF CONCERN OVER THE POSSIBILITY OF A U.S. -SOVIET CLASH OVER LEBANON; ON THE OTHER, THE SOVIETS SEEMED TO DERIVE "SATISFACTION" FROM THE PRESENCE OF U.S. MARINE "HOSTAGES" IN LEBANON, WHICH WAS PERCEIVED AS GENERATING ARAB ENMITY WITH THE U.S. AND, ULTIMATELY, CREATING DOMESTIC POLITICAL PROBLEMS FOR THE PRESIDENT.

10. THE SCHOLAR WAS TOLD THAT ANDROPOV HAD RECENTLY WRITTEN A MEMORANDUM ADDRESSED TO THE CENTRAL COMMITTEE INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT IN WHICH HE REPORTEDLY ASSERTED THAT SOVIET POLICY IN THE MIDDLE EAST WAS TOO PASSIVE AND REACTIVE AND DIRECTED THAT THE SOVIET UNION TAKE THE INITIATIVE. WHETHER ANDROPOV HAD IN MIND DIPLOMATIC OR MILITARY ACTIONS WAS UNCLEAR. THE SCHOLAR MAINTAINED THAT, ON A MORE GENERAL PLANE, THE GENERAL SECRETARY WAS INCREASINGLY SEEKING TO TAKE CONTROL OVER FOREIGN POLICY AND TO UNDERMINE GROMYKO.

11. THE AMBASSADOR SUGGESTED THREE FACTORS WHICH HE THOUGHT COULD ACCOUNT FOR THE CHANGE IN THE ATMOSPHERE AND ATTITUDES WHICH THE ACADEMIC HAD ENCOUNTERED HERE: THE TURN FOR THE WORSE IN ANDROPOV'S HEALTH, THE KAL INCIDENT, AND THE REALITY OF THE INF DEPLOYMENTS. THE ACADEMIC AGREED WITH THIS ASSESSMENT, LAYING PARTICULAR STRESS ON THE FIRST FACTOR. THERE HAD BEEN A GREAT SENSE OF CONFIDENCE AMONGST HIS INTERLOCUTORS HALF A YEAR AGO, HE SAID. A SENSE OF THE POSSIBILITY OF POSITIVE CHANGE BECAUSE OF THE UNITY FORGED BY A STRONG LEADER. ANDROPOV'S ABSENCE FROM THE SCENE FOR THE

LAST FEW MONTHS HAD PERMITTED DIFFERENCES TO EMERGE AND HAD GENERATED A SENSE OF LEADERLESSNESS. WHETHER ANDROPOV COULD AGAIN ASSERT HIMSELF AS THE STRONG LEADER WHOM ALL BELIEVED WAS NECESSARY AND BEHIND WHOM ALL COULD UNITE WAS FOR THE MOMENT PROBLEMATICAL.

ANDROPOV'S HEALTH

12. THE SCHOLAR'S CONTACTS INDICATED THAT THE GENERAL SECRETARY HAD UNDERGONE AN OPERATION (THE DATE AND NATURE OF WHICH WERE NOT SPECIFIED) AND HAD BEEN
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EXDIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
-- DOMESTIC POLICY

ORDERED TO REST FOR AT LEAST FOUR OR FIVE WEEKS. WHILE
PECUPERATING AT HIS DACHA, HOWEVER, MAJOR DECISIONS
HAD BEEN SUBMITTED TO HIM AND RESOLUTIONS HAD BEEN
WRITTEN UNDER HIS DIRECTION. DURING THIS RECUPERATIVE
PERIOD, USTINOV HAD SERVED AS ANDROPOV'S STAND-IN;
CHERNENKO HAD BEEN COMPLETELY BYPASSED. ANDROPOV
HAD CONTINUED TO MEET WITH SENIOR FIGURES INDIVIDUALLY
WHEN HE HAD BEEN UNABLE TO ATTEND POLITBURO MEETINGS.
(THE PERIOD OF TIME DURING WHICH ANDROPOV HAD NOT
ATTENDED THESE MEETINGS WAS UNCLEAR.)

13. AT ANY RATE, ACCORDING TO THE ACADEMIC, ANDROPOV
WAS NOW BACK AT WORK ALTHOUGH UNDER STRICT ORDERS TO
LIMIT HIS SCHEDULE. THE SCHOLAR HAD BEEN TOLD THAT THE
GENERAL SECRETARY WORKS CURRENTLY EIGHT HOURS A DAY WITH
A BREAK FOR A MID-DAY REST. (COMMENT: THIS SCHEDULE
WOULD ACCORD WITH THE PATTERN OF ANDROPOV'S MOTORCADE
MOVEMENTS.) WEEKENDS WERE TO BE RESERVED FOR REST.

OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV

14. THE SCHOLAR IS CONVINCED THAT THERE ARE SIGNIFICANT
DIFFERENCES WITHIN THE LEADERSHIP (HE DID NOT PROVIDE
ANY ELABORATION) AND THAT OPPOSITION TO ANDROPOV'S
EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC REVIVAL IS CENTERED IN THE ECONOMIC
BUREAUCRACY AND IN MID-LEVEL PARTY ORGANS AT THE RAION
(DISTRICT) LEVEL. THE SCHOLAR CHARACTERIZED THE RAIKOM
SECRETARIES, TYPICALLY MEN IN THEIR 30'S AND 40'S, AS
INTENSE PATRIOTS--EVEN CHAUVINISTS--WHO BELIEVED THAT
THE COUNTRY SHOULD BE MOBILIZED TO MEET THE CHALLENGE
FROM THE U. S. THEY WERE NOT ACTIVE SUPPORTERS OF
ECONOMIC CHANGE. "IT WAS ANYBODY'S GUESS" WHETHER
ANDROPOV'S RETURN TO A MORE ACTIVE ROLE WOULD RESULT
IN THE ELIMINATION OR ISOLATION OF THIS OPPOSITION TO
CHANGE, BUT THE SCHOLAR FELT SURE THAT ONE OF HIS
GENERAL SECRETARY'S GOALS WILL BE TO UNDERTAKE A
"CLEANING-OUT." HE BELIEVED THAT THERE WOULD SOON BE
MAJOR PERSONNEL CHANGES IN THE MINISTRIES AND AT LOWER
PARTY LEVELS, AND SAID THAT PROMOTIONS INTO THE POLITBURO
MIGHT BE ANNOUNCED AT THE UPCOMING PLENUM. (COMMENT:
PRESS COVERAGE OF THE ONGOING PARTY-ELECTION CAMPAIGN

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HAS INDEED BEEN SHARPLY CRITICAL OF THE PERFORMANCE OF NUMEROUS DISTRICT LEVEL ORGANIZATIONS. WHILE THE CAMPAIGN HAS NOW REACHED THE OBLAST LEVEL, DISTRICT LEVEL OFFICIALS ARE STILL BEING SINGLED OUT FOR SHORTCOMINGS.)

15. THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE HAD HEARD FROM TWO SOURCES THAT ANDROPOV HAD SENT A HARD-HITTING LETTER TO ALL PARTY ORGANIZATIONS IN OCTOBER THAT DECLARED IN NO UNCERTAIN TERMS THAT THE FATHERLAND WAS IN DANGER AND UNDERScoreD THE NECESSITY OF REVIVING AND REINVIGORATING THE SOVIET ECONOMY. REPORTEDLY ANDROPOV STRESSED THAT HE WAS NOT EXAGGERATING THE EXTERNAL DANGER TO THE NATION, AND HE WARNED THAT THE TIME HAD PASSED WHEN A "FORMALISTIC" APPROACH TOWARD CHANGES MANDATED BY THE CENTER WOULD BE TOLERATED AND THAT THOSE WHO DID NOT SUPPORT THESE CHANGES ASSIDUOUSLY WOULD BE DEALT WITH RUTHLESSLY. (COMMENT: WE HAVE RECENTLY HEARD A SIMILAR REPORT FROM A CHINESE DIPLOMAT, WHO SPECULATED THAT THE INTENT OF THE LETTER HAD BEEN TO PREPARE THE COUNTRY FOR AN INCREASED DEFENSE BURDEN.)

ECONOMIC REFORM

16. WHILE SOVIET CONTACTS EVINced A CONTINUED RECOGNITION THAT MAJOR ECONOMIC CHANGES WERE ESSENTIAL, THE SCHOLAR DETECTED A MARKEDLY DECREASED CONVICTION THAT SUCH CHANGES COULD BE SUCCESSFULLY IMPLEMENTED. THE SCHOLAR HIMSELF WAS PESSIMISTIC THAT CURRENT EFFORTS WOULD MAKE AN APPRECIABLE DENT IN A SYSTEM STILL GOVERNED BY AN UNREAL PRICING MECHANISM AND A LACK OF MEANINGFUL MATERIAL INCENTIVES. THERE SEEMED TO BE NO WAY, HE ASSERTED, OF BREAKING THE VICIOUS PRODUCTIVITY/INCENTIVES CIRCLE. WHILE THE SOON-TO-BE INTRODUCED EXPERIMENT IN INCREASED ENTERPRISE AUTONOMY DID INDEED REPRESENT THE MOST MEANINGFUL STEP TAKEN IN THE SPHERE OF ECONOMIC CHANGE SINCE THE LATE 60'S, IT WAS ULTIMATELY DOOMED TO FAILURE. IT WAS TYPICAL OF PREVIOUS EFFORTS AT ECONOMIC CHANGE IN THAT IT WAS LIMITED IN APPLICATION AND INCREMENTAL IN APPROACH. AS IT STOOD, IT WAS LIKELY TO BE ABSORBED AND THUS SMOTHERED WITHIN THE SYSTEM EVEN IF THE EXPERIMENT PRODUCED POSITIVE RESULTS WITHIN THE FIVE MINISTRIES WHERE IT IS TO GET UNDERWAY NEXT JANUARY. THE SCHOLAR
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EXDIS
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PGOV, PREL, ECON, PINR, UR
SUBJECT: AMERICAN ACADEMIC ON SOVIET FOREIGN AND
-- DOMESTIC POLICY
CITED ONE ECONOMIC OFFICIAL WHO CONCURRED WITH HIS OWN
PESSIMISTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE EXPERIMENT'S LIKELIHOOD
OF HAVING A MEASURABLE IMPACT ON THE ECONOMY AS A WHOLE.

17. THE ACADEMIC COMMENTED THAT THE MILITARY APPEARS TO HAVE SOMETHING OF AN AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARDS ECONOMIC CHANGE. ON THE ONE HAND, THEY ARE WORRIED ABOUT THE WEAKNESS OF THE CIVILIAN ECONOMY AND ARE ESPECIALLY CONCERNED ABOUT SCIENTIFIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL PROGRESS. THIS IMPELS THEM TO SUPPORT CHANGE ON A FAIRLY MAJOR SCALE. ON THE OTHER HAND, THE MILITARY RECOGNIZE THAT THE PROCESS OF CHANGE WILL YIELD LITTLE IMMEDIATE BENEFITS FOR THEM AND MAY EVEN CONSTRICT THEIR SHARE OF THE RESOURCES PIE. ONE THING IS CERTAIN-- THE MILITARY STRONGLY BACK THE ANDROPOV DRIVE FOR GREATER WORK DISCIPLINE.

18. IN RESPONSE TO A QUERY ON RYZHKOV (WHOM THE SCHOLAR DID NOT SEE ON THIS TRIP), THE SCHOLAR SAID THAT HE REMAINED ACTIVE AS HEAD OF THE CC'S ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT, WHICH WAS CONCENTRATING ON THE STRATEGIC ECONOMIC ISSUES AS DISTINCT FROM DAY-TO-DAY OPERATIONAL ISSUES. THE ACADEMIC REFERRED TO HIS EARLIER UNDERSTANDING THAT THIS NEW DEPARTMENT WOULD SUPERSEDE THE OTHER CC ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS (REF MOSCOW 5473) AS NO LONGER CURRENT. WHILE THERE WOULD BE NO ACROSS-THE-BOARD ABOLITION OF THE OTHER ECONOMIC DEPARTMENTS OF THE CC AS HE REPORTED IN MAY, SEVERAL OF THEM MAY BE FUSED. IN ANY EVENT, THE ECONOMICS DEPARTMENT HEADED BY RYZHKOV IS CLEARLY IN CHARGE OF LONG-TERM STRATEGIC THINKING ON THE ECONOMY.

19. THE SCHOLAR HAD HEARD LAST MAY THAT A NEW STAFF WOULD BE CREATED FOR THE DEFENSE COUNCIL - IT WOULD BE PART OF AN NSC STAFF COMPOSED OF MILITARY OFFICERS IN MUFTI AND CIVILIANS. THE IDEA WOULD BE TO GIVE ANDROPOV A STRONGER STAFF. ON THIS TRIP THE ACADEMIC HAS HEARD THAT THIS STAFF EXISTS BUT IS NOT PLAYING A MAJOR ROLE - PERHAPS ANOTHER CASUALTY OF ANDROPOV'S ILLNESS. THE SCHOLAR EXPECTS ITS ROLE TO INCREASE, HOWEVER.

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20. THE ACADEMIC'S INTERLOCUTORS HAVE INCLUDED POLITBUREAU
CANDIDATE MEMBER PONOMAREV, CC INTERNATIONAL DEPARTMENT
DEPUTY CHIEF ZAGLADIN, IMEMO DIRECTOR YAKOVLEV, IUSAC
DIRECTOR ARBATOV, IEWSS DIRECTOR BOGOMOLOV AND OTHER
OFFICIALS IN ECONOMIC ORGANS AND INSTITUTES.
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and others